I got this book for Christmas last year, but had been putting off reading it because of its size and scope. It's a fairly comprehensive look at the entire war, from the build-up of Germany in the 1930s to the surrender of Japan in 1945. Perhaps the best feature of it is that it draws largely from the letters and journals of those involved in order to give the reader an idea of what the people involved were going through.
One of the defining elements of All Hell Let Loose is Hastings' extensive use of hindsight to point out the errors of those in command, ranging from the national leaders to the generals conducting the war. He doesn't spare anyone, criticizing the command failures of Churchill and Roosevelt as much as he does Hitler. In that vein, he looks extensively at the records and reputations of the generals and admirals involved in the war and generally judges them on their merits. He makes an interesting point that in many ways MacArthur was not a very good general and was often driven by his ego rather than national objectives (such as his retaking of the Philippines) but that he had such an effective domestic propaganda machine that it was almost impossible to rein him in. He is also not afraid to criticize those generals often thought to have been geniuses and heroes, such as Rommel.
Along the same lines, Hastings often pokes holes in the defining myths and public perceptions that people have about the war. He doesn't paint every encounter in terms of "heroes," he also points out incidents of cowardice and incompetence. He looks critically at things like resistance movements (pointing out that they were in reality far less widespread and supported than the people of occupied countries like to believe after the war) and the idea of unity of purpose between the Allies (including between the Western Allies). Perhaps the only public perception of the war that he doesn't take issue with is that of general Italian incompetence in almost every engagement they were a part of.
Interestingly, because he makes such extensive use of hindsight himself, Hastings points out the follies of applying the benefits of hindsight to the issue of the atomic bomb, and makes two very good points about it. First, the use of the bomb cannot be looked at in isolation. It was developed as a weapon to increase the firepower of the Allied arsenal, and that was the spirit in which it was used. Dropping it and killing a large number of civilians was not a moral concern for the American decision makers, since they had already been killing large number of civilians in the bombing runs of German cities and the firebombing of Japanese cities, and at that point of the war the lives of the enemy were counted cheaply alongside the lives of American soldiers. Second, the very fact that the American government had gone through such expense and effort to create it almost guaranteed that it would be used. Similarly to the use of new bombers in Europe long after the purpose of bombings had been exhausted, the expense provided the impetus to use them.
Hastings also makes an interesting contrast between the fighting styles of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was more invested in the fight because they had been invaded, and were therefore willing to go through greater lengths to win the war. They also had a far larger army, and could therefore afford to lose more soldiers. Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian nation meant that the government could demand greater sacrifice from the soldiers. Casualty rates that would have caused outrage and protest in the Western democracies were shrugged off because Stalin was not accountable to the people.
Finally, Hastings makes an excellent point that the war cannot be explained in the simplistic terms of a fight between good and evil, since it was far more nuanced than that. Atrocities were committed on both sides, but the difference lies in the scale and intent. Whereas the Nazis began the war and committed countless horrific crimes, in general the crimes of the Western Allies were isolated incidents. Hastings is also quick to point out that in order to win the war the West had to ally itself with the Soviet Union, who committed many war crimes against the enemy, against refugees within its borders, and against its own soldiers. In that light, one must look at the war crimes trials following the war with some criticism, since crimes committed by Axis soldiers that were punished with imprisonment or death (such as the murder of POWs) were generally overlooked when committed by Allied soldiers.
I had only a small number of criticisms of All Hell Let Loose. First, I wish that he had looked more closely at a number of major events (such as Iwo Jima or the death of FDR), but can understand why he didn't find time or space to do so. Secondly, in his coverage of the Atlantic convoy system, I wish that he had examined the Canadian role in more detail, although that is likely my Canadian bias peeking through. Finally, the book contained a number of grammatical problems that at times made it somewhat annoying to read. I felt that in some cases Hastings made more of an effort to construct a pretty looking sentence than one that got the point across effectively.
Those problems are all minor things, and do not in any way detract from what is an excellent book. I would recommend it to both people who know a great deal about the Second World War and those who know very little.
