Kenneth Macksey - Military Errors of World War Two

I bought this book yesterday at a used book sale on the recommendation of one of the workers, who gave it high praise. It was interesting, but not overly so. The basic premise of the book was to examine the various errors made by both sides in World War Two (mistakes made by the upper-level commanders) and then examine how they played out and what might have happened had other decisions been made.


Some of the mistakes that Macksey looked at were ones that have been examined countless times, such as the failure during Market Garden to secure bridges in order to allow for Allied advances, or the mistakes made by Admiral Nagumo during the Battle of Midway. For the most part he does not offer new insights into these mistakes, but merely discusses what countless other historians have looked at already.

Macksey also examined Dunkirk, although he presented a possibility that I had not considered before. He is of the opinion that had the Germans pressed on, not only would they have killed or captured many of the Allied troops (an opinion that is shared by most historians) but would have also been able to launch an immediate invasion of Britain based on the fact that all three branches of the British military were severely weakened at that moment. It was an interesting bit of conjecture that I had not thought of.

Macksey's central thesis for many of the mistakes made revolves around technology. Namely, that the commanders and governments of all of the countries involved were generally unable to keep up with or effectively apply new scientific advances. He points to this as being a deciding factor in the Germans not developing advanced U-Boats to win the Battle of the Atlantic, the failure of the Japanese to aggressively pursue radar, and the failure of either side to invest in tanks that were effective in desert warfare (allowing the North Africa campaigns to drag on longer than necessary).

Overall, Military Errors was an interesting read, but not an overly insightful one. Much of what Macksey discussed has been examined many times before.